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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the impact of economic conditions on voter turnout at Portuguese 
legislative and municipal elections. We use four extensive datasets to estimate an economic 
turnout model in which local economic variables are included in quadratic form, so that 
non-linear effects can be taken into account. The first two datasets cover all mainland 
municipalities (currently 278), from 1979 to 2005. The other two are cross-sections of all 
4037 mainland freguesias, used to analyze the determinants of turnout at the 2001 
municipal elections and at the 2002 legislative elections. Empirical results indicate that the 
performance of the national economy is important only in legislative elections and that, in 
accordance with our expectations, the regional and local unemployment rates tend to have 
a non-linear relationship with turnout.  
 
 
Keywords: Turnout, Local governments, Elections, Portugal, Economic conditions 
JEL Classifications: D72, H7 
 
January 2012 
  
4 
 
1. Introduction 
The search for explanations as to why some people vote while others do not has 
attracted a significant amount of research, and the empirical literature has uncovered a long 
list of variables which affect voter turnout, such as education, age and the electoral design. 
However, a convincing picture of the relationship between the economy and voter turnout 
has eluded researchers, and little attention has been paid on the subject in comparison with 
the vast literature found analyzing how people vote. We find two valid theoretical 
explanations for the effect of economic conditions on turnout which suggest opposing 
effects, and the empirical evidence has provided mixed results. The question as to whether 
economic conditions foster or depress turnout remains unanswered and, in fact, many 
researchers believe that they do not affect turnout at all.  
The main goal of this paper is to provide new insights and contribute to a better 
understanding of this relationship. Using four extensive datasets, we find robust empirical 
evidence indicating that economic conditions affect turnout rates in Portugal, not only at 
legislative elections, but also at municipal elections. Moreover, the results support the 
hypothesis that the economy has non-linear effects on turnout. That is, the presence and 
magnitude of mobilization or withdrawal effects on turnout depend on the severity of 
recessions. Concretely, mild recessions seem to have withdrawal effects, while more severe 
economic conditions have a mobilization effect.  
We believe that the identification of non-linear effects of economic variables on 
turnout is a significant contribution to the literature. It is possible many previous studies 
obtained mixed results for the effects of economic performance on turnout because the 
possibility that those effects are non-linear effects was not properly taken into account. This 
study also investigates the effects of standard socio-demographic and institutional variables. 
Although there are some studies which examine turnout at Portuguese elections in a 
sociological perspective (see, among others, Freire and Magalhães 2002), to the best of our 
knowledge, there are no articles focusing on the economic dimension nor using panel data 
techniques. We simultaneously analyze legislative and municipal elections, using similar 
variables, models and estimation methods, thus permitting a clear assessment of the 
differences and similarities between turnout behavior at Portuguese first and second order 
elections. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship between 
turnout and economic conditions. Section 3 describes the model and dataset used. The 
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panel data results are presented in section 4, while section 5 reports the cross section 
results. Finally, conclusions are presented in section 6. 
 
2. Turnout and the economy 
Since the 1980s, numerous studies analyzed the determinants of voter turnout and 
various theories emerged addressing the many different aspects of the theme (see Geys 
2006 and Blais 2006 for encompassing surveys). As in stands, the existing research as 
established some robust patterns. Sociological characteristics, especially age and education, 
have been consistently referenced as important explanatory factors (see, among others, 
Blais 2000, Franklin 2004, Lijphart 1997).  We also know relatively well why turnout is higher 
in some countries than in others. Comparative studies show that different Institutional 
arrangements embodied in electoral laws provide different turnout outcomes (Powell 1986, 
Jackman 1987, and Jackman and Miller 1995). In general, the more accountable and 
competitive the political systems are, the larger the electoral mobilization is. 
However, regarding the effect of the economy on turnout, the literature provides 
mixed results and is far from reaching a consensus. Strong evidence is found supporting the 
idea that the economy affects how a person votes and a great deal of scholarly attention 
has been paid to the issue (see Paldam 2004). Comparatively, studies analyzing if (and how) 
the economy affects whether a person votes or not are scarce and we find conflicting 
theories and inconsistent results. There is, however, relatively strong support for the 
hypothesis that turnout is higher in economically advanced countries (Blais and Dobrzynska 
1998, Norris 2002, Fornos et al. 2004). 
The literature provides two competing theories regarding the expected relationship 
between turnout and the economy. The first argues that people under economic strain are 
more prone to vote, in what Schlozman and Verba (1979) called a “mobilization” effect. In 
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this view, people are encouraged to be more active politically (vote, protests participation, 
lobbying…) because they blame the government for their economic hardships and wish to 
manifest their discontentment regarding the government’s policies. The “negative voting” 
theory (see Lau 1982) reinforces this argument as it posits that the motivation to politically 
punish is greater than the motivation to politically reward, therefore economic duress 
should foster turnout. 
The second theory argues the opposite. It assumes that voters respond to adverse 
economic conditions by withdrawing from the political process. The reason is that people 
facing economic hardships face serious problems, therefore they tend to focus their efforts 
and attention on solving them and, as a result, pay less attention to external matters like 
politics. Rosenstone (1982) argues that this relationship holds, not only at the individual 
level, but also at the aggregate level, and some studies find evidence that especially the 
poor and the unemployed exhibit a strong reduction in their capacity to participate in 
politics (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Caldeira et. al. 1985).  
Along with these two competing explanations, the alternative of no effect is also 
possible. This idea seems to be dominant, either by omission or empirically supported, as 
we find a considerable amount of literature not addressing the issue of economic effects, 
and significant evidence supporting the notion that economic conditions do not affect 
turnout (see, among others, Fiorina 1978, Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Blais 2000, 
Kostadinova 2003, Fornos et al. 2004).  
However, a nil effect of the economy on turnout, as some studies report, is 
considerably different from a null effect. Radcliff (1992) points out that, as the two 
contestant theories exhibit solid arguments but contradictory claims regarding the expected 
effect of the economic environment on turnout, the most likely scenario is a nil overall 
effect, because both withdrawal and mobilization effects may indeed occur simultaneously. 
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The null effect hypothesis raises the question of whether economic variables are 
being properly introduced in the turnout function. Radcliff (1992) provides a first insight on 
the matter when observing that in developed countries adverse economic conditions tend 
to depress turnout, as Rosenstone (1982) suggests, but in the developing countries the 
opposite occurs. He argues that “the difference may be attributable to the stakes involved. 
In the absence of security programs the potential human costs of poor economic 
performance are much greater.”(Radcliff 1992: 446) He found evidence that the effect of 
the economy is best modeled when interacted with a measure of security programs and 
using a polynomial form. 
In this paper we try to go further by testing the hypothesis that both withdrawal and 
mobilization effects exist simultaneously and that different degrees of adverse economic 
conditions provide different stimuli to voters. We posit that scenarios of mild recession may 
generate a strong dominance of the withdrawal effect, while more severe economic 
hardships may cause the mobilization effect to be dominant. Whatever the intensity of a 
recession, the poor and the unemployed will be extremely concerned with their personal 
situation and probably behave as Rosenstone (1982) proposes, so the question is how the 
middle and upper class voters react to recessions? As they constitute the majority of voters, 
their response will be critical to the dominant effect of the economy on turnout. It is 
common to find that people react to bad economic conditions with concern, and the 
intensity of this feeling is obviously tied with each voter’s personal situation, which depends 
on labor status, available security programs, and other factors. Although each person’s 
reaction is unique, there is a probable common trend: as economic conditions worsen, the 
concern with one’s welfare increases. For the middle class voter, an increase in 
unemployment means that the probability of losing her job increases, and although she may 
not be currently unemployed, she will become more concerned and react by, for instance, 
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watching more news on economic issues, attending meetings, and in general, becoming 
more involved in political activities. It is then plausible to assume that, as economic 
conditions worsen, the increasing concerns with the economy increase the chances for 
mobilization and the importance of the economy in the decision to participate.  
In periods of mild recession or stagnation, one may expect a dominance of the 
withdrawal effect. All those facing critical financial problems probably behave as 
Rosenstone (1982) suggests. For others, alienation from the political process is a strong 
possibility, as they may not exhibit enough concern about the economy to actually 
participate. Furthermore, the economy may not be a sufficiently important issue to be 
relevant for the decision of whether to vote or not.  
One way of modeling these effects is to use the economic variables in a quadratic 
form, as it allows the identification of increasing or decreasing marginal effects. We use this 
alternative in our analysis of turnout for the Portuguese elections. To conform to theoretical 
expectations the coefficients associated with economic variables must result in an inverted 
U-shaped quadratic form for variables such as income or GDP and exhibit the opposite 
shape for variables such as unemployment or inflation. 
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3. Data and model specification 
We use four extensive datasets to analyze the economic determinants of turnout. The 
first two are comprised of panel data for all mainland Portuguese municipalities1 (currently 
278), ranging from 1979 to 2005. One dataset covers 10 electoral periods for legislative 
elections and the other covers 8 electoral periods for municipal elections. The second group 
of datasets is cross-sectional and regards the 2001 municipal elections and the 2002 
Legislative elections. They comprise all mainland freguesias2 (a total of 4037). Yearly 
unemployment data is not available at the level of freguesias, but because 2001 was a 
census year, data for the unemployment rate at both municipal and freguesia levels are 
available. This enables us to investigate the salience of the local unemployment rate at a 
much more disaggregated level than previous studies have attempted. Electoral results and 
political data used were all obtained from the Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the 
Electoral process (STAPE). 
The empirical model used has an autoregressive component and is of the following 
form: 
EiiEiEiEiEiEiEi unalInstitucioSocialECOECOTURNTURN ,,,,,,,    54
2
3211  (1)
 
where TURNi,E is the number of votes in municipality/freguesia i at election year E as a share 
of the eligible population3 and EiECO ,  is a set of economic variables. Then, to control for 
non-economic determinants of turnout, we include one set of institutional variables and 
one set of socio-demographic regressors. Finally, i is the fixed effect for municipality i, and 
ui,E is the error term. 
                                                             
1 Mainland Portugal is divided into 278 municipalities (municípios or concelhos). Usually, a municipality has the 
name of its biggest town or city or, in some cases, of its historically most important town or city. The 
municipality is, usually, considerably larger than the city or town after which it is named. 
2
 Each Municipality is subdivided into a variable number of freguesias. These are the lowest administrative 
units in Portugal. 
3
 For municipal elections we use the turnout regarding Town Council elections, which are the ones that 
determine the mayor. Voters also cast their votes on the same day for the Municipal Assembly and for the 
Assembly of the freguesia. 
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Regarding the economic variables used, the national unemployment rate was 
obtained from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators. Data for the regional GDP (at the NUTS 
III level), and the unemployment rate at the freguesia and NUTS III levels4 were obtained 
from the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (INE). The regional NUTS III 
unemployment rate was available only for 1991 and from 1999 onwards, thus reducing time 
variability and the number of observations in our sample. To overcome this difficulty, we 
estimated a proxy of the unemployment rate for the remaining years of the 1990’s using the 
multiple imputation algorithm developed by Honaker and King (2010). There are no 
consistent time series data for unemployment available at the municipal level, however. To 
control for the labor market at the municipal level we use data on employment in private 
firms seeded in each municipality, which is available on the “Quadros de Pessoal” database 
of the Portuguese Ministry of Labor and Social Solidarity (MTSS).5 Also from this source, we 
use the average municipal wage growth rate, available since 1985. As a measure of 
municipal income, we use the Marktest’s Sales Index, which reflects municipalities’ wealth 
by taking into consideration the population, fiscal burden, electricity consumption, 
automobiles sales, and the number of bank agencies and of retail stores. 
To control for the municipalities’ socio-demographic characteristics we include some 
of the typical explanatory variables found in empirical studies: population density, the 
illiteracy rate, the share of the resident population above 65 years old, and the percentage 
of the municipality’s population employed in the tertiary sector. Data on Municipal 
population were obtained from the local authority’s (Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais - 
DGAL) annual publication called Finanças Municipais (Municipal Finances). The illiteracy rate 
                                                             
4
 NUTS is a geocode standard for referencing the subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes, used within 
the European Union. In Portugal, a hierarchy of three NUTS levels is established. Continental Portugal 
corresponds to a NUTS I region, which is subdivided into 5 NUTS II regions. These 5 regions are then subdivided 
into 28 sub regions (NUTS III) each one comprised of several municipalities.  
5
 This is a yearly mandatory employment survey that covers almost all privately owned firms employing paid 
labor in Portugal (public servants and own employment are not included).  
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and the data on the percentage of the population in the tertiary sector were obtained from 
the Census operation of the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (INE). Data were 
available for 1981, 1991 and 2001. As the evolution of this type of variables over time is 
generally based on a stable trend, a constant growth rate was assumed to fill in the missing 
data. Data on population by age was obtained by assuming a constant growth rate for the 
period 1979-1989, on the basis of the 1970 and 1981 census; for the remaining years annual 
data was acquired from INE’s resident population estimates. A larger population is expected 
to be associated with lower electoral turnout. Population measures are often used to check 
Downs’ (1957) claim of a direct relationship between turnout and the probability of casting 
the decisive vote. In general, studies show that higher education is linked with higher 
participation (see Blais 2000). Therefore, one should expect the illiteracy rate to be 
negatively correlated with turnout.6 Regarding age, studies generally report it having a 
positive effect on turnout. However, as we use the population over 65 years old, this effect 
may be mitigated because, for older people, health issues may inhibit some from going to 
the ballots. 
The percentage of the population employed in the tertiary sector may be viewed as a 
proxy for urbanization and, simultaneously, a measure of education, as white collar workers 
tend to be more educated than the average worker. We have no prior regarding the sign of 
the coefficient associated with this variable. On the one hand, the sociological theory posits 
that urbanization tends to weaken interpersonal bounds (Hoffman-Martinot 1994), 
therefore depressing turnout but, on the other hand, higher levels of education seem to be 
related with higher turnout. 
The empirical model also includes a set of institutional variables traditionally found in 
turnout studies. We use a standard measure of closeness of the elections defined as the 
                                                             
6
 However, some comparative studies report the opposite relationship. For instance Franklin (2004) found a 
negative effect on turnout of the percentage of the population with a college degree. 
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difference in vote percentages between the largest party and its closest challenger. There is 
ample evidence regarding the importance and the positive effect of competiveness on 
turnout (Gyes 2006). In our empirical model, for legislative elections this is a district 
measure, as deputies in Portugal are elected by district, while for local elections it is 
constructed by municipality, as all local government branches are elected for the 
municipality. With similar geographical differences between local and national elections, we 
introduce the Laakso and Taegepera (1979) index for the effective number of political 
parties. Theoretically, there is no consensus whether fragmentation can be expected to 
increase or decrease political participation. Geys (2006) reviews the aggregate-level 
literature on turnout and concludes that on this matter results are clearly inconclusive.  
Another political indicator used is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a 
local government is controlled by the party that holds power at the national level, and zero 
otherwise. This simultaneous government variable pinpoints the municipalities that exhibit 
the maximum clarity regarding the responsibility hypothesis, therefore enabling us to check 
if the reward/punishment mechanism associated with government voting also affects 
turnout. If so, the expected sign is negative, and reinforces the idea that turnout and 
government voting are linked. We also link past government vote with current turnout by 
introducing in the empirical model for the legislative elections the votes received by the 
government in the previous election. We expect a negative effect on turnout, as some of 
the people that supported the government may be discontent with its performance and find 
no credible alternative, therefore opting to abstain in the coming election. This means that 
the more overwhelming an electoral victory is the more it tends to depress future turnout.  
Finally, one particular point of difference between local and national elections in 
Portugal is the possibility to find groups of citizens running alongside with parties in 
municipal elections. We introduce a dummy variable to control for the presence of these 
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groups in local elections. Descriptive statistics for all variables used are found in the 
appendix. 
Given the dynamic structure of the model, it is not appropriate to estimate equation 
(1) using OLS. In both the fixed and random effects settings, the lagged dependent variable 
is correlated with the error term, even if we assume that the disturbances are not 
themselves autocorrelated. According to Arellano and Bond (1991), this implies inconsistent 
estimates of the model, when, as in both our two samples, there is a clear dominance of 
cross sections (278 municipalities) over time periods (10 legislative or 8 municipal elections). 
These authors developed a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator that solves 
the problems referred to above. First differencing (1) removes the individual effects (i) and 
produces an equation that is estimable by instrumental variables. In this paper, we use the 
extended version of the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998), the System-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data 
models. 
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4. Panel data empirical results 
Table 1 reports the results of system-GMM estimations7 for turnout at legislative and 
municipal elections, from 1979 to 2005. Since data for economic variables at the municipal 
and regional levels start later than 1979, we begin our analysis by estimating regressions 
without those variables, so that the entire sample period could be considered and the 
number of observations would be maximized. Thus, in the estimations whose results are 
reported in Table 1, only lagged turnout and the vectors of social and institutional variables 
described in the previous section were considered. 
-- Insert Table 1 about here -- 
The results for legislative elections (see Column 1) indicate that turnout tends to be 
smaller in municipalities with higher illiteracy rates, where the mayor belongs to the party 
that leads the national government, and where the national government obtained higher 
shares of votes in the previous elections. They also show that turnout is persistent, that is, 
turnout at previous elections is strongly and positively related with turnout in the current 
elections (the estimated coefficient is 0.8). All these results conform to our expectations. 
Finally, turnout does not seem to be affected by demographic variables, competitiveness, 
and the number of effective parties. The lack of effects of the last two variables may be due 
to the fact that, for legislative elections, they are calculated at the district level. 
Column 2 reports the results of the estimation for municipal elections. Results are 
similar to those obtained in Column 1 for all variables that were statistically significant, 
except simultaneous government, which is no longer significant. Now, all demographic 
variables seem to affect turnout, which is negatively related with population density and 
                                                             
7
 Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples are reported. The number of 
observations, municipalities and instruments, and the results of the Hansen and autocorrelation tests are 
reported at the foot of the table. It is worth noting that, in all estimations of tables 1, 2 and 3, the Hansen test 
never rejects the validity of the over-identifying restrictions, and autocorrelation of second order is always 
rejected. Thus, all our system-GMM estimations meet the requirements set forth by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
for the validity of GMM estimations of dynamic panel data models. 
15 
 
with the percentage of the population in the tertiary sector, and increases with greater 
percentages of the population over 65 years old. Finally, the results found for 
competitiveness point to an increase in turnout when elections are more competitive 
(smaller vote difference between the two most voted parties), a result in accordance with 
theoretical expectations and general empirical evidence. As to fragmentation, there are 
strong theoretical arguments supporting both positive and negative effects. Our results are 
supportive of the latter, as they show that higher effective number of parties reduces 
turnout in Portugal. Jackman (1987) argues that, under given electoral rules, more 
fragmentation increases the need for coalition formation, thus decreasing the influence 
voters have in government formation. Additionally, more parties increase the complexity of 
the electoral choice (Blais and Dobrozynska, 1998) and add extra information costs 
(Hoffman-Martinot, 1994) which can discourage voters from going to the polls. 
Economic variables are included in the estimations of Table 2 (legislative elections) 
and Table 3 (municipal elections). Each estimation of columns 1 to 3 includes the national 
unemployment rate and two municipal/regional economic variables in quadratic form. 
Column 1 of Table 2 reports the results obtained for turnout at legislative elections when 
regional (NUTS III) unemployment and real GDP are included.8 Higher national 
unemployment rates are associated with higher turnout, which provides evidence in favor 
of the mobilization approach (Schlozman and Verba 1979, Lau 1982, Rosenstone 1992). The 
regional (NUTS III) unemployment rate seems to have a U-shaped relationship with turnout 
(negative sign for the level and positive sign for the squared level). Thus, lower rates of 
regional unemployment have a negative effect on turnout but, as unemployment increases, 
the effect becomes positive. The turning point is at an estimated unemployment rate of 
                                                             
8
 Since regional GDP data is available only from 1991 onwards, the number of observations is considerably 
smaller than in the estimation of Column 1 of Table 1 (about one half). 
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7.46%. Real GDP does not seem to affect turnout, when unemployment is taken into 
account.  
-- Insert Table 2 about here -- 
In the estimation of Column 2 of Table 2, regional unemployment and GDP were 
replaced with the employment rate and real wages in the municipality.9 As expected, there 
is evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between employment and turnout. The 
growth rate of real wages in the municipality does not seem to affect turnout. The regional 
(NUTS III) unemployment rate and the municipal sales index were used in the estimation of 
Column 3.10 As expected, the former has a U-shaped relationship with turnout (as in Column 
1), while the latter has an inverted U-shaped relationship. Finally, the estimation of Column 
4 includes the linear terms of all economic variables. Regional real GDP and municipal 
employment seem to be positively related with turnout. The absence of statistical 
significance for the regional unemployment rate may be due to the omission of the squared 
term, as the results of columns 1 and 3 clearly support the existence of a U-shaped 
relationship between the regional (NUTS III) unemployment rate and turnout. 
Regarding the remaining explanatory variables, the most robust results are that 
turnout is persistent and that simultaneous governments reduce turnout. Greater 
competitiveness now seems to decrease turnout in columns 2 to 4, a result lacking 
theoretical explanation but that some studies report (see Kischgassner and Himmern, 
1997).11 The votes obtained by the national government in the previous election seem to 
increase turnout in the current election (see columns 1, 3 and 4). This result is a bit strange, 
as it is the opposite of the one obtained in Table 1. Finally, the remaining independent 
                                                             
9 Data is available from 1985 onwards. Relative to the estimation of column 1, we gain one election for 275 
municipalities. 
10
 Since the municipal sales index is available only from 1992 onwards, this is the estimation with the smallest 
number of observations: we lose one election relative to column 1, and two elections relative to column 2. 
11
 As our results seem to be in accordance with theoretical expectations at municipal elections, this surprising 
result for legislative elections may be due to the fact that we are using municipal data, but our measure of 
competitiveness is district based. 
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variables are only statistically significant in one or two estimations, which may indicate that 
their relationship with turnout is not robust. 
Table 3 shows the results obtained for municipal elections. Contrary to what 
happened for legislative elections, the national unemployment rate does not seem to affect 
voter participation. Although some voters may wish to reward/penalize the national 
government in municipal elections, it is not likely that the mobilization effect is of a 
magnitude comparable to that at legislative elections, when voters are directly judging the 
national government. 
-- Insert Table 3 about here -- 
As happened for legislative elections, there is evidence of a U-shaped relationship 
between regional unemployment rates and turnout (see columns 1 and 3). Thus, in 
municipal elections, voters tend to pay more attention to regional (NUTS III) unemployment, 
which is more closely related to municipal economic performance than national 
unemployment rates. The absence of statistical significance for the regional unemployment 
rate in column 4 may be due to the omission of the squared term. The regional real GDP, 
municipal employment, municipal real wages, and the municipal sales index do not seem to 
affect turnout, as none of these variables is statistically significant in the estimations of 
Table 3. Concerning the other explanatory variables, there is robust evidence that turnout is 
persistent, that it increases with greater shares of the population over 65 years old, greater 
competitiveness, and in municipalities where lists of independent citizens run for office. 
Turnout decreases with greater percentages of workers in the tertiary sector, higher 
effective number of parties, and with simultaneous governments. Population density and 
the illiteracy rate are only statistically significant in column 2, both with a negative sign. 
In an overall assessment, although unemployment seems to matter in both first and 
second order elections, our results for the economic variables are generally more robust for 
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legislative elections. The contrary occurs regarding institutional and socio-demographic 
variables; they seem to play a larger role in municipal elections. In light of the responsibility 
hypothesis, the first assessment makes sense, and, as to the second, it seems that different 
elections provide different stimuli to voters. 
 
5. Cross-section empirical results 
This section uses different datasets in order to test for the effects of freguesia and 
municipal level unemployment rates in turnout at the 2001 municipal elections and at the 
2002 legislative elections. Yearly unemployment data is not available at the freguesia level, 
but because 2001 was a census year, it is possible to obtain this data and test the effect of 
this important economic variable at the lowest level of aggregation.  
We made two changes to the model used in the previous section. First, the percentage 
of the municipal population in the tertiary sector was replaced by a dummy variable, Urban 
Areas, which takes the value of one for the freguesias that are mainly urban areas, and zero 
otherwise. Second, instead of the percentage of the municipal population over 65 years old, 
we use the percentage of retired people in each freguesia. They are very similar measures, 
and the swap was made because these were the closest proxies we could find in the census 
data. In the regressions for legislative elections, we omitted the closeness measure and the 
number of parties because, as they are measured at the district level, their variability would 
be very small in a cross section of freguesias (there would be only 18 different values for 
each of these variables). 
We use three alternative estimation methods that deal with the typical problem of 
heteroscedasticity found in cross section analysis.12 The first is the standard OLS regression 
with robust standard errors. The second is the weighted least squares (WLS) method 
                                                             
12
 It is necessary to account for heteroscedasticity because both the Breusch-Pagan and the White tests 
rejected the homoscedasticity assumption in our model. 
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proposed by Madalla (1983) which identifies the heteroscedastic process and proposes a 
logistic transformation to the dependent variable.13 This method takes into account the 
differences in population between freguesias, thus reporting more efficient estimators than 
OLS. In the third method, after the WLS, we use a Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS)14 
in order to control for other unknown causes of heteroscedasticity. These last two methods 
are less vulnerable to heteroscedasticity than OLS. 
The results of cross-section regressions for turnout at the freguesia level in Portuguese 
legislative elections are reported in Table 4. Since OLS results are less reliable than WLS and 
WLS/FGLS results, our comments concentrate on the latter two methods. WLS results 
provide evidence of a U-shaped relationship between unemployment rates at the freguesia 
level and turnout. Considering that the turning point is at an unemployment rate of 17,87%, 
for most cases only the negative effect matters. This is what the WLS/FGLS results indicate, 
as squared unemployment is not statistically significant in column 3. Thus, higher 
unemployment at the freguesia level had essentially a demobilizing effect in the 2002 
legislative elections. 
-- Insert Table 4 about here -- 
WLS/FGLS results indicate that growth in wages at the freguesia level has an inverted 
U-shaped relationship with turnout, with a turning point at around 3%. Concerning the 
other independent variables, turnout is persistent, and it decreases in urban areas, with 
higher illiteracy rates, and with the votes obtained by the national government in the 
previous election. WLS/FGLS estimation results also indicate that turnout may increase with 
simultaneous governments and with greater percentages of retired people. 
-- Insert Table 5 about here -- 
                                                             
13 ))/(log( ii TurnTurnTurn  1 . See Dubin and Kaslow (1996) for an application of this method. 
14
 Starting with the estimated logistic model, we correct for other potential sources of heteroscedasticity using 
the feasible generalized least square method proposed by Wooldridge (2003). 
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The cross-section results for municipal elections are reported in Table 5. WLS and 
WLS/FGLS support the existence of a U-shaped relationship between unemployment and 
turnout, which is in line with the panel data results reported in Table 3. There is also 
evidence that higher wages increase turnout. In this case, the mobilization effect would be 
to reward the local government. Furthermore, turnout is persistent, it increases with 
simultaneous governments, with greater percentages of retired people, and when lists of 
independent citizens run alongside parties. Finally, turnout seems to decrease in urban 
areas and increase with competitiveness. 
 
6. Conclusion 
There is an extensive literature focusing on voter participation, and empirical studies 
have been able to identify a long list of variables which affect turnout. Nevertheless, the 
effect of economic performance on turnout is still an unsettled issue. There are two 
theoretical explanations for the effect of economic conditions on turnout which suggest 
opposing effects (mobilization vs. withdrawal effects), and the empirical evidence has 
provided mixed results. Thus, there is still no consensus as to whether worse economic 
performance fosters or depresses turnout. In fact, several researchers argue that the 
economy does not affect voter participation at all.  
This paper’s main contribution to the literature is to test the hypothesis that both 
withdrawal and mobilization effects exist simultaneously, and that different degrees of 
adverse economic conditions provide different stimuli to voters. Concretely, we hypothesize 
that, for relatively small rates, unemployment has essentially withdrawal effects, while 
more severe economic conditions resulting in higher unemployment rates, have 
mobilization effects (more people will want to penalize the incumbent government). 
Using four extensive datasets, we perform system-GMM panel data estimations and 
OLS, WLS and WLS/FGLS cross section estimations for turnout at Portuguese legislative and 
municipal elections. Our results provide robust empirical evidence indicating that economic 
conditions affect voter participation rates in Portugal. Moreover, the results support the 
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hypothesis that the economy has non-linear effects on turnout. That is, the presence and 
magnitude of mobilization or withdrawal effects depend on the severity of economic 
conditions. Concretely, there is a U-shaped relationship between unemployment rates and 
turnout: at low rates, unemployment seems to have withdrawal effects, while for higher 
rates (above 7.5%) it has mobilization effects. Employment rates and real wages are also 
found to have non-linear effects on turnout, with the expected signs (inverted U-shaped 
relationship). 
We believe that the identification of non-linear effects of economic variables on 
turnout is a significant contribution to the literature. It is possible previous studies obtained 
mixed results for the effects of economic performance on turnout because non-linear 
effects were not tested for or were not properly taken into account. 
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Table 1. Turnout: GMM Panel Estimates 1979-2005 
 
 Legislative Municipal 
 (1) (2) 
Population density 0.006 -0.044*** 
 (0.817) (-2.807) 
%pop. over 65 0.037 0.152*** 
 (1.568) (5.405) 
%pop. Tertiary sector 0.003 -0.059*** 
 (0.403) (-6.245) 
Illiteracy rate -0.065*** -0.053* 
 (-3.049) (-1.957) 
Competitiveness 0.002 -0.106*** 
 (0.368) (-8.805) 
Effective Number of Parties -0.308 -2.178*** 
 (-1.309) (-5.629) 
Simultaneous government -0.485*** -0.216 
 (-4.210) (-1.197) 
Turnout (previous election) 0.800*** 0.772*** 
 (42.123) (47.130) 
Gov. votes (previous election) -0.036***  
 (-7.763)  
Groups of citizens  3.616*** 
  (4.924) 
Observations 2748 2199 
Municipalities / Instruments 275/262 275/243 
Hansen Test 266.4[0.145] 241.8[0.225] 
AR(1) Test -8.911[0.00] -9.854[0.00] 
AR(2) Test -0.517[0.605] -0.793[0.428] 
NOTES: Two step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples. All estimations 
include a constant term and a complete set of time-dummies, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics and those in squared brackets are p-values. All estimations 
include a complete set of time-dummies. 
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Table 2. Turnout: Legislative Elections - GMM Panel Estimates  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
National unemployment rate 0.031 0.061 0.051 -0.132 
 (0.239) (0.583) (0.381) (-1.003) 
Unemployment -0.407*  -0.488** 0.008 
 (-1.756)  (-2.210) (0.183) 
Squared unemployment 0.027*  0.034**  
 (1.783)  (2.337)  
Real GDP -0.061   0.009 
 (-1.162)   (0.608) 
Squared real GDP  0.002    
 (1.64)    
Employment rate  -0.047  0.022 
  (-1.611)  (1.384) 
Squared employment rate  0.001   
  (1.316)   
Growth in wages  -0.004  0.002 
  (-0.216)  (0.131) 
Squared growth in wages  -0.001   
  (-0.443)   
Sales index   0.025 -0.018 
   (1.006) (-1.617) 
Squared sales index   -0.000  
   (-1.246)  
Population density -0.006 -0.026*** -0.003 0.001 
 (-0.544) (-3.026) (-0.370) (0.094) 
%pop. over 65 0.076* 0.133*** 0.090** 0.113** 
 (1.930) (4.647) (2.296) (2.521) 
%Tertiary sector -0.035*** -0.066*** -0.039*** -0.033*** 
 (-2.711) (-5.882) (-3.013) (-2.716) 
Illiteracy rate 0.008 -0.055* -0.000 -0.013 
 (0.192) (-1.748) (-0.007) (-0.283) 
Competitiveness (municipality) -0.087*** -0.085*** -0.072*** -0.087*** 
 (-10.165) (-6.528) (-5.671) (-9.697) 
Eff. Number of Parties (municipality) -1.972*** -1.765*** -1.536*** -2.113*** 
 (-5.963) (-4.880) (-4.224) (-6.426) 
Simultaneous government -0.613*** -0.171 -0.582*** -0.693*** 
 (-2.903) (-0.883) (-2.741) (-3.258) 
Groups of citizens 3.099*** 3.210*** 2.915*** 2.953*** 
 (5.251) (5.807) (4.868) (4.933) 
Turnout (previous election) 0.779*** 0.805*** 0.803*** 0.789*** 
 (26.238) (40.819) (25.570) (23.654) 
Observations 1100 1375 1100 1100 
Municipalities / Instruments 275/237 275/269 275/242 275/229 
Hansen Test 239.4[0.164] 264.6[0.266] 244.9[0.161] 221.8[0.275] 
AR(1) Test -7.723[0.00] -8.186[0.00] -7.699[0.00] -7.687[0.00] 
AR(2) Test -0.188[0.851] -0.863[0.388] -0.429[0.668] -0.315[0.753] 
NOTES: Two step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples. All estimations include a constant term, a 
complete set of time-dummies and the third lag of the dependent variable, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in 
parenthesis are t-statistics and those in squared brackets are p-values. All estimations include a complete set of time-dummies. 
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Table 3. Turnout: Municipal Elections - GMM Panel Estimates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
National unemployment  0.935*** 0.869*** 1.065*** 0.979*** 
 (11.867) (12.486) (13.151) (11.835) 
Unemployment -0.403***  -0.820*** -0.046 
 (-3.408)  (-6.095) (-0.987) 
Squared unemployment 0.027***  0.054***  
 (3.346)  (5.771)  
Real GDP  0.007   0.034*** 
 (0.218)   (2.978) 
Squared real GDP  0.000    
 (0.672)    
Employment rate  0.070***  0.022* 
  (2.835)  (1.862) 
Squared employment rate  -0.001**   
  (-1.982)   
Growth in wages  -0.000  0.016 
  (-0.028)  (0.686) 
Squared growth in wages  0.001   
  (1.426)   
Sales index   0.068*** -0.008 
   (3.015) (-1.055) 
Squared sales index   -0.0001***  
   (-2.831)  
Population density -0.004 0.015 0.002 0.005 
 (-0.583) (1.409) (0.208) (0.348) 
%pop. over 65 0.042 0.079*** -0.037 -0.001 
 (1.624) (3.034) (-1.191) (-0.025) 
%Tertiary sector -0.007 -0.027*** -0.012 -0.020** 
 (-0.782) (-3.311) (-1.303) (-1.998) 
Illiteracy rate -0.031 -0.040 0.058* 0.024 
 (-1.046) (-1.422) (1.674) (0.609) 
Competitiveness (district) 0.007 0.015** 0.037*** 0.036*** 
 (1.036) (2.037) (4.529) (3.978) 
Eff. Number of Parties (district) -0.180 -0.852*** -0.193 -0.464 
 (-0.778) (-3.180) (-0.808) (-1.542) 
Simultaneous government -0.584*** -0.269** -0.320** -0.369** 
 (-4.477) (-2.085) (-2.282) (-2.532) 
Turnout (previous election) 0.702*** 0.599*** 0.650*** 0.616*** 
 (26.186) (23.022) (19.194) (17.987) 
Gov. votes (previous election) 0.017*** 0.002 0.026*** 0.025*** 
 (2.685) (0.320) (4.451) (4.059) 
Observations 1375 1650 1100 1100 
Municipalities / Instruments 275/259 275/269 275/262 275/252 
Hansen Test 263.3[0.144] 268.2[0.192] 254.7[0.306] 252.9[0.177] 
AR(1) Test -6.112[0.00] -6.783[0.00] -5.30[0.00] -5.347[0.00] 
AR(2) Test -0.0955[0.924] -0.422[0.192] -0.922[0.357] -1.473[0.141] 
NOTES: Two step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples. All estimations include a constant term, a  
complete set of time-dummies and the third lag of the dependent variable, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in 
parenthesis are t-statistics and those in squared brackets are p-values. All estimations include a complete set of time-dummies. 
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Table 4. Turnout: 2002 Legislative Elections  
 
 OLS WLS WLS/FGLS 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Growth in wages 0.0241 0.00263 0.00454* 
 (0.437) (1.419) (1.923) 
Squared growth in wages -0.0038 -0.00038 -0.00075** 
 (-0.517) (-1.471) (-2.282) 
Unemployment  -0.0153 -0.00572*** -0.00640* 
 (-0.363) (-2.600) (-1.762) 
Squared unemployment  0.0007 0.00016** 0.00009 
 (0.460) (2.046) (0.586) 
Urban areas -0.2095 -0.01329* -0.01458* 
 (-1.272) (-1.930) (-1.705) 
Illiteracy rate -0.0982*** -0.00380*** -0.00485*** 
 (-5.354) (-3.863) (-5.017) 
Simultaneous government 0.0028 0.01228 0.01521* 
 (0.013) (1.634) (1.878) 
Population density 0.0525* 0.00164* 0.00061 
 (1.745) (1.670) (0.955) 
%Retired people -0.0320** 0.00049 0.00198** 
 (-2.509) (0.572) (2.195) 
Turnout (previous election) 0.7714*** 0.03522*** 0.03681*** 
 (40.980) (41.513) (49.417) 
Gov. votes (previous election) -0.0316*** -0.00235*** -0.00268*** 
 (-4.527) (-6.330) (-6.127) 
Observations 4,019 4,019 4,019 
Adjusted R-squared 0.776 0.824 0.857 
NOTES: All estimations include a constant term. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in 
parenthesis are t-statistics. 
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Table 5. Turnout: 2001 Municipal Elections  
 
 OLS WLS WLS/FGLS 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Growth in wages 0.0512 0.0116* 0.01706** 
 (0.834) (1.773) (2.033) 
Squared growth in wages 0.0086 -0.0012 -0.00233 
 (1.013) (-0.791) (-1.239) 
Unemployment  -0.1202* -0.0215*** -0.02888*** 
 (-1.659) (-3.123) (-3.270) 
Squared unemployment  0.0032 0.0007*** 0.00101*** 
 (1.164) (3.053) (3.025) 
Urban areas -2.2410*** -0.0828*** -0.08354*** 
 (-6.458) (-5.118) (-4.908) 
Illiteracy rate 0.0121 0.0003 0.00078 
 (0.485) (0.173) (0.379) 
Simultaneous government -0.4977 0.0478** 0.06515*** 
 (-1.193) (1.988) (2.711) 
Population density -0.0423 0.0005 -0.00012 
 (-0.210) (0.108) (-0.030) 
%Retired people 0.0432** 0.0084*** 0.01025*** 
 (2.424) (3.110) (3.762) 
Competitiveness (municipality) -0.0615*** -0.0018*** -0.00129** 
 (-6.976) (-3.762) (-2.368) 
Groups of citizens 2.3326*** 0.1517*** 0.18143*** 
 (3.878) (3.254) (3.219) 
Turnout (previous election) 0.8300*** 0.0368*** 0.03500*** 
 (41.931) (28.901) (26.439) 
Observations 4,009 4,009 4,009 
Adjusted R-squared 0.685 0.798 0.796 
NOTES: All estimations include a constant term. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in 
parenthesis are t-statistics. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics: Panel Data (Legislative elections) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Turnout 3033 71.9642 10.12391 48.06974 94.1557 
National unemployment rate 2780 6.693509 1.518209 4.07 8.86 
Unemployment rate  1390 5.972381 2.454735 1.57 14.3 
Real GDP 1390 3.687086 6.205422 0.242127 40.50569 
Employment rate 1934 16.03878 10.02724 1.029703 87.61473 
Growth in wages 1656 1.759789 4.826512 -26.9679 26.07056 
Sales Index 1103 3.626564 10.24918 0.2 160.14 
Population density 2758 2.868164 8.895024 0.058178 96.35504 
% population over 65 years old 2757 17.38805 5.961829 5.326595 42.02425 
% Tertiary sector 2750 41.91003 15.61383 9.155093 85.56738 
Illiteracy rate 2750 19.05551 8.725882 3.728859 54.98336 
Competitiveness 2758 16.99795 11.81036 0.047844 45.81835 
Effective Number of Parties 2759 3.156304 0.639557 2.035882 5.080246 
Simultaneous government 2755 0.408349 0.491618 0 1 
Government share of votes  3033 37.01825 15.5527 5.453149 85.45291 
 
 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics: Panel Data (Municipal elections) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Turnout 2480 66.97211 7.358434 36.7938 92.64069 
National unemployment rate 2224 6.450909 1.522798 4.08 8.86 
Unemployment rate  1112 6.249824 2.445535 1.67 12.03128 
Real GDP 1112 3.703672 6.223877 0.247569 40.50569 
Sales Index 1103 3.626618 10.1494 0.19 151.85 
Growth in wages 1381 0.463713 5.166349 -41.1102 21.24216 
Employment rate 1656 16.26608 10.05406 1.029703 90.1767 
Population density 2205 2.8496 8.804773 0.058178 96.36732 
% population over 65 years old 2205 17.62704 6.012745 5.353324 42.02425 
% Tertiary sector 2203 42.82315 15.4991 9.155093 84.91925 
Illiteracy rate 2203 18.52168 8.560274 3.728859 54.98336 
Competitiveness 2206 19.86058 14.66725 0.018191 87.92598 
Effective Number of Parties 2206 2.654976 0.512906 1.186214 4.68719 
Simultaneous government 2223 0.421503 0.493911 0 1 
Groups of citizens 2221 0.021612 0.145445 0 1 
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics: Cross section 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Turnout (Municipal Elections) 4035 68.58307 9.713741 32.45 95.84 
Turnout (Legislative Elections) 4037 61.37206 7.7184 20.41 88.62 
Growth in wages 4037 1.445557 2.358816 -7.95722 10.33196 
Unemployment rate 4037 7.007629 4.831338 0 38.3 
Urban Areas 4037 0.239039 0.426549 0 1 
Illiteracy rate 4037 14.97067 7.946764 1.3 53.6 
Simultaneous government 4037 0.482537 0.499757 0 1 
Population density 4036 0.521825 1.872446 0.0014 35.54 
% of retired people 4037 25.09507 10.54528 0 85.6 
Competitiveness (municipal elections) 4035 25.42264 18.28788 0 93.62 
Groups of citizens 4035 0.109046 0.311735 0 1 
Government votes (previous election) 4020 42.05093 12.90834 2.94 88.39 
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